The Failure of Efficiency-based Definitions of the Disease Concept
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4454/mefisto.10-1.1647Keywords:
Health and Disease Debate, Biostatistical Naturalism, Functional Efficiency Theory, Dispositional Profile Efficiency TheoryAbstract
In this paper, I will discuss treatments of the disease concept deepening the Boorsian notion of functional efficiency: Hausman’s functional efficiency theory (FET) and Thorell’s dispositional profile efficiency theory (DPET). I will show that contrary to their purpose, they do fail to bring forward definitional characteristics of the disease concept enabling us to distinguish between health and disease. Against DPET, I will also contend that it commits us to calling disease something that is not arguably a disease and that it leads to the conclusion that certain conditions are both pathological and non-pathological at the same time depending on the chosen reference class, which is misleading. Most fundamentally, I will argue that these very failures reveal a structural impossibility: both FET and DPET cannot specify the evaluative standard required by their own definitions without presupposing a prior distinction between healthy and pathological functioning, a circularity that is not incidental but inherent to the biostatistical approach.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyrights are transferred for 18 months starting publication date from the author(s) to the Publisher. After this period, the content is released under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International).