The Failure of Efficiency-based Definitions of the Disease Concept

Authors

  • Claudio Davini University of Pisa

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4454/mefisto.10-1.1647

Keywords:

Health and Disease Debate, Biostatistical Naturalism, Functional Efficiency Theory, Dispositional Profile Efficiency Theory

Abstract

In this paper, I will dis­cuss treatments of the disease concept deepening the Boorsian notion of functional efficiency: Hausman’s functional ef­ficiency theory (FET) and Thor­ell’s dispositional profile effici­ency theory (DPET). I will show that contrary to their pur­pose, they do fail to bring forward definitional characte­ristics of the disease concept enabling us to dis­tinguish between health and disease. Against DP­ET, I will also contend that it commits us to cal­ling di­sease something that is not arguably a di­sease and that it leads to the conclusion that cer­tain conditions are both pathological and non-pa­thological at the same time depend­ing on the chosen reference class, which is mis­leading. Most fundamentally, I will argue that these very failures reveal a structural impossibility: both FET and DP­ET cannot specify the evaluative standard required by their own definitions without pre­supposing a prior distinction between healthy and patholo­­gical functioning, a circularity that is not incidental but inherent to the biostatistical approach.

Published

2026-11-12

Issue

Section

Essays