Rethinking Dysfunction: Institutional Epistemology and the Marginalization of ADHD in Women
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4454/mefisto.10-1.1650Keywords:
ADHD, Dysfunction, Epistemic injustice, Institutional epistemology, Psychiatric diagnosisAbstract
Existing philosophical accounts of dysfunction primarily focus on biological malfunction, evolutionary failure, or deviations from normal functioning, but pay comparatively little attention to the institutional epistemic conditions through which dysfunction becomes recognizable in diagnostic practice. Using Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) in women as a case study, this paper argues that dysfunction is not simply identified by psychiatric institutions but is also shaped by the classificatory frameworks, evidential standards, and interpretive assumptions through which diagnostic judgments are made. Drawing on philosophy of medicine, institutional epistemology, and the literature on epistemic injustice, it shows how gendered diagnostic norms contribute to systematic misrecognition and how mechanisms such as masking, testimonial injustice, and looping effects can generate cumulative epistemic disadvantage over time. The paper argues that existing theories of dysfunction share an important blind spot concerning these institutional epistemic processes and proposes understanding dysfunction as an institutionally mediated epistemic category.
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