Locke on Morality and Religion

Résumé

This essay investigates two sets of questions: first, whether Locke thinks that it is possible in principle, and, if so, whether it is possible in practice, for morality to be demonstrated; second, whether Locke thinks that religious assumptions are needed to demonstrate morality, and, if so, whether he thinks that it is possible to come to know those assumptions on the basis of reason, or only believe them on the basis of divine revelation, Christianity in particular.  In answer to the first set, it is argued that, according to Locke, morality is indeed demonstrable in principle, and that, apart from the limitations of time and effort imposed by sheer finitude, there are no insuperable practical obstacles, deriving from the nature of the task or from the infirmities of the human intellect, to moral demonstration.  In answer to the second set, and paying particularly close attention to the arguments of Jeremy Waldron on Locke’s views on basic equality, it is argued that Locke’s demonstrations of substantive moral truths (such as our status as moral equals, as well as our moral rights and duties) all depend on his proof of the existence of God, but do not depend in any way on any distinctively Christian assumptions.