Locke in Göttingen
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.4454/sl.3-462Mots-clés :
Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, Christoph Meiners, Michael Hißmann, soul, personal identityRésumé
This paper focuses on Locke’s place in positions developed by three of the most important Göttingen philosophers of the 1770s and 1780s - Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, Christoph Meiners, and Michael Hißmann. The first section after the introduction looks at their endorsement of what Meiners calls “Locke’s method” and comments in general terms on their relation to Locke. Section 3 argues that their accounts of some central aspects of Locke’s philosophy are problematic. In order to account for the complexity of the Göttingen philosophers’ relation to Locke, sections 4 to 6 examine in more detail their views and arguments on two central issues in the philosophy of mind, the nature of the human soul and personal identity.