“Man’s Propriety in the Creatures”

Locke, Divine Ownership, and the Right to Exclude

Résumé

Locke holds that everyone “has a Property in his own Person” (II, 27). But he also contends that God owns each human being: “They are his Property, whose Workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure” (II, 6). Generally, when one agent owns something, this excludes others from owning it at the same time. So, if I own myself, how can it be that God owns me, too? Call this Locke’s ownership puzzle. I argue that the ownership puzzle dissolves once we understand that Lockean property is a three-place relation among an owner, some agent(s), and a thing owned such that (1) the owner holds a claim against (2) some other agent(s) that they not interfere (without permission) with (3) the thing owned. Consequently, distinct owners can unequivocally hold a property right in the same thing at the same time if they hold that right against different agents.