The ethics of pathologisation in DSM

Abstract

This paper explores the phenomenon of the pathologisation of a vast set of behaviours and experiences and the increase in psychiatric diagnoses produced by the DSM. In the first paragraph, the debate between Jerome Wakefield and some psychiatrists of the American Psychiatric Association on the pathologisation of bereavement, incorporated in the diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder by the DSM-5, will be examined. In the second paragraph it will be shown that the arguments based on the concept of dysfunction, taken up by both philosophers and psychiatrists, lead to an insoluble antinomy and a tautological definition of mental disorders. Starting from Canguilhem's positions, an attempt will be made to shift the perspective from the empirical to the ethical: it will be shown that the phenomenon of pathologisation is a consequence of the normative structure of the DSM. In the third section, the ethical assumptions underlying the DSM will finally be investigated and its utilitarian and operational logic aimed at optimising behavioural traits will be highlighted.