The Specificity of Statutory Interpretation. In Conversation with L. Ramírez-Ludeña, J.J. Moreso, J. Rabanos, C. Valentini and J.M. Vilajosana
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4454/analisiediritto.v23i1.625Keywords:
Conversational Model, Conversational Implicatures, Statutory Interpretation, Grice, Interpretative SkepticismAbstract
This essay aims to reply to some criticisms, formulated by Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña, José Juan Moreso, Julieta Rabanos, Chiara Valentini e Josep Vilajosana, against my recent book Il modello conversazionale (ETS, 2020). After summarising the central theses of my work, I will discuss my critics’ comments by dividing them into four groups. The first group aims at contesting my thesis that the conversational model neither applies nor is applicable to statutory interpretation; the second group criticises the thesis that the conversational model is a good explanatory model of ordinary conversation, including normative conversation; the third group of comments relates to the interpretative theory that my theses imply or presuppose; finally, the fourth group concerns aspects or topics that I did not adequately investigate in the text. I will argue that the criticisms of the first three groups are unfounded, instead I will concede the plausibility of those of the last group, which highlight certain aspects of my research that I will have to explore further.
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