First Replies to Criticisms on "Teoría analítica del derecho"
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4454/analisiediritto.v22i1.447Keywords:
Deontic logic, Normativity, Applicability, Social Rules, nterpretation, Analytic Philosophy, InterpretationAbstract
In this essay I try to offer a first response to some critical comments to my book Teoría analítica del derecho (hereinafter TAD). I discuss with Ratti about deontic logic, with Moreso about the normativity of law and the scope of a positivistic theory, with Navarro about the applicability of legal norms, with Scavuzzo and Figueroa about social rules and the rule of recognition, with Comanducci about the degrees of indeterminacy of law, with Guastini on the characterization of legal positivism, normative hierarchies, power-conferring rules, and interpretation, and with Barberis on the relevance of an analytical approach in legal philosophy.
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