A Path that Forks. Legal Science between Is and Ought

  • Riccardo Guastini Tarello Institute for the Philosophy of Law, University of Genoa
Keywords: pure theory of norms, legal norms, legal statements, legal statements about norms, validity, logic of norms, logic of legal statements

Abstract

Distinguishing between law and legal science –between legal norms and the juristic description of norms– is a crucial point for the pure theory. Nonetheless, Kelsen seems unable to give a consistent and satisfactory account of both the wording and the logical form of legal statements (or propositions of law), that is, the sentences by which legal scholars are supposed to describe the law. In particular, he cannot decide whether legal statements are empirical (is-) or normative (ought-) sentences. This is especially clear in his posthumous General Theory of Norms.

Published
2021-11-12
Section
Allgemeine Theorie der Normen 1979-2019